The paper presents the welfare cost of inflation in a banking time economy that models exchange credit through a bank production approach. The estimate of welfare cost uses fundamental parameters of utility and production technologies. It is compared to a cash-only economy, and a [Lucas, Robert Jr. E. 2000. "Inflation and Welfare." Econometrica 68 (2): 247-274.] shopping economy without leisure, as special cases. The paper estimates the welfare cost of a 10% inflation rate instead of zero, for comparison to other estimates, as well as the cost of a 2% inflation rate instead of a zero inflation rate. A zero rate is statutorily specified as the US inflation rate target in the 1978 Employment Act amendments. The paper provides a conservative welfare cost estimate of 2% inflation instead of zero at $33 billion a year. Estimates of the percent of government expenditure that can be financed through a 2% vs. zero inflation rate are also provided.
Introduction
The welfare cost of inflation remains an issue of importance given monetary policy's worldwide adoption of inflation rate targeting. For example, US Congress passed a 1978 Act amending the 1946 Full Employment Act to state that the US inflation rate should be zero from 1988 onwards unless other goals conflict with this. The US Federal Reserve System (Fed) has in recent years established an explicit 2% inflation target, in apparent violation of statutory law; see Section 2 for details. This leaves important whether inflation, which continually is a source of government revenue, is very costly as a tax or not, even at low levels of the inflation rate.
The paper shows a "modern", neoclassical, banking based, view of how to compute the welfare cost of inflation. Abstracting from the inclusion of capital accumulation, as in Lucas's (2000) "Inflation and Welfare", the paper builds a banking time model rather than Lucas's shopping time model. Related to Silva (2012) , who endogenizes the number of times banking activity is conducted in order to avoid optimally the inflation tax, the advantage here is that all parameters are fundamental to either the bank production function or to the other standard utility and goods technology production frontiers. The resulting welfare cost function shows the importance of two channels in avoiding the inflation tax: banking, which produces credit, so as to use less real money for the chosen amount of consumption goods, and secondly leisure use which allows avoidance of the implicit inflation tax by consuming less goods. As reflected in the interest elasticity of money demand, as shown below, it ends up that credit use makes money demand much more interest elastic as compared to leisure use, making credit use the major component of the welfare cost of inflation.
The welfare cost is constructed as the compensating asset endowment required to keep utility when facing inflation the same as utility at the Friedman (1969) optimum. The result is that in the case of no utility derived from to leisure, the welfare cost as a fraction of full income is exactly the time used in banking. This extends the Lucas (2000) result of how, in a similar economy with no leisure, the welfare cost is exactly the shopping time as in a McCallum and Goodfriend 1987 shopping time economy. Silva (2012) has similar results in his baseline model without leisure, in that then the welfare cost of inflation is due almost solely to banking activity. 1 With substitution towards leisure, the consumer can balance a somewhat lower consumption level against the use of labor in banking to avoid the inflation tax by using exchange credit. This marginal tradeoff is seen in terms of the marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure, which equals the ratio of the shadow price of goods to leisure. In this shadow price, goods have a shadow cost of exchange that is a weighted average, per unit of consumption goods, of the average cost of using money plus the average cost of using credit. The average exchange cost of using credit results from the banking production function.
The paper presents the welfare cost of a 10% inflation rate instead of a zero inflation, as well as the cost of a 2% inflation rate instead of a zero rate. It also computes the welfare cases when banking is not permitted (equivalent to a zero productivity parameter in banking production), but leisure still can be used to avoid inflation, and the case when leisure is not used (leisure preference is zero) but banking is a viable means to avoid inflation. For the 2% inflation rate instead of zero, the paper estimates how much national income is being lost relative to the 1978 Act target of a zero inflation rate. This is calculated to be some $33 billion a year.
US law on the target inflation rate
According to the US Federal Reserve Bank the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) has since 2012 adopted an explicit inflation target of 2%. In January 2012 the FOMC stated 2 "The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2012)."
The same January 2012 FOMC statement continues that it will not specify the level of employment to be targeted:
"The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment" [bold added].
In contrast, current US law in the form of the 1978 Amendments to the 1946 Full Employment and Stability Act precisely sets both the targeted US inflation rate and the US unemployment rate. For inflation, it states that the US inflation rate should be 3% by 1983 and should be 0% by 1988 and afterwards, unless it conflicts with the employment goal. For unemployment, rates of 4% for aged 16 and over, and 3% for aged 20 and over, are to be met within 5 years of the passing of the 1978 Act (so by 1983).
Further, the Act specifies that only the President or Congress can change these goals. The US Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) is not allowed, by any existing law, to change these goals. Therefore, it is not authorized, without Presidential or Congressional mandate, to set a 2% inflation rate target as it did in 2012, because the target is currently specified in law as zero percent unless it conflicts with achieving the unemployment target. And it is not authorized to change the target unemployment rate of the 1978 Act. 3 The Fed seemingly has a big loophole in that the 1978 Act specifies that the inflation rate target may be higher if it conflicts with the unemployment rate targets. But when the Fed set its 2% inflation target, it also specifically stated that the inflation target does not affect the unemployment rate, in that this is set by "nonmonetary factors". So the Fed closes the loophole offered to it under the 1978 Act by saying the inflation and unemployment rates are "largely" unrelated.
However the Fed's logic for not setting an unemployment rate goal is faulty. Rather than its authority to set unemployment rate targets being based on some envisioned relation between the inflation rate and the unemployment rate, the Fed has no authority to set unemployment rate targets since the fact is that these are already set in the 1978 Act, which provides no authority to the Fed to alter these targets. It is the specific US 1978 statutory law, which specifically precludes the Fed from having authority to change the unemployment rate targets, that implies that for the Fed: "it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment". The end result is that today the Fed has given no Congressionally valid reason for setting a 2 inflation rate target in deliberate contradiction of the 1978 Act's target of a zero inflation rate.
There are four relevant sections of the Act, 4.b1.-4.b.4, which, respectively set out the unemployment rate goal, the inflation rate target for the first 5 years, the inflation rate target for all years after 1988, and the authority for changing these targets.
"Section 4.b.(1). reducing the rate of unemployment, as set forth pursuant to Section 3(d) of this Act, to not more than 3 per centum among individuals aged twenty and over and 4 per centum among individuals aged sixteen and over within a period not extending beyond the fifth calendar year after the first such Economic Report; and Section 4.b.(2) reducing the rate of inflation, as set forth pursuant to Section 3(e) of this Act, to not more than 3 per centum within a period not extending beyond the fifth calendar year after the first such Economic Report: Provided, That policies and programs for reducing the rate of inflation shall be designed so as not to impede achievement of the goals and timetables specified in clause (1) of this subsection for the reduction of unemployment." "Section 4.c.(2). Upon achievement of the 3 per centum goal specified in subsection (b) (2), each succeeding Economic Report shall have the goal of achieving by 1988 a rate of inflation of zero per centum: Provided, That policies and programs for reducing the rate of inflation shall be designed so as not to impede achievement of the goals and timetables specified in clause (1) of this subsection for the reduction of unemployment." Section 4.d states that only the President or Congress may change these goals:
"if the President finds it necessary, the President may recommend modification of the timetable or timetables for the achievement of the goals provided for in subsection (b) and the annual numerical goals to make them consistent with the modified timetable or timetables, and the Congress may take such action as it deems appropriate consistent with title III of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978."
Using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment goal of 4% for over 16 years of age was achieved for briefly in December 1999, and for several months into 2000, when it dipped into the 3+% range. However, since October 2017 this rate has been below 4%. 4 The rate for ages over 20 has been in the 3+ range since October 2017, being at 3.4% in October 2018.
The legislatively binding US law, which sets the US inflation rate to be zero permanently, seems to be contraindicted such that a permanent 2% inflation rate target is set "de facto" by the Fed. Would this contradiction of US law be based on the inability to meet some unemployment goal, it might be acceptable as an interim policy. But, 1) the Fed FOMC openly admits in January 2012 that monetary policy has little if any ability to affect the long term employment rate (as quoted above). And 2), the goals of the 1978 law on unemployment are now largely met, although having taken longer than the 5 years allowed. This achievement of the statutory US unemployment goals seems to imply unambiguously that the inflation target should now be zero.
To summarize and emphasize the conundrum here: First, the Fed claims the 2 inflation target is not chosen to achieve the unemployment goal, since it cannot affect unemployment. Second, the unemployment goal appears to have been met as of now anyway. Third, the inference results that the Fed appears to be contravening statutory law of a 0% inflation rate by their self-established 2% target. If so, then by US law, the Fed 2% inflation target is a judicially challengable over-reach by the Fed relative to US statutory law. While economists can consult the lawyers, this is clearly controversial, if not illegal, policy practice by the Fed, even though there is not much of a fuss made over it by academics. Economists though can propose ways to quantify the cost of the Fed's contraindiction of the zero inflation rate in favor of the 2% target. This is done here through the standard approach of the welfare cost of inflation, in terms of a 2% rate compared to zero.
Banking time model
Consider an exchange economy using only labor, and no physical capital. With log utility u, over goods c t and leisure x t ,
and a linear production of output using only labor time l t , and with w ∈ R ++ ,
the allocation of time constraint now is that labor, l t , bank production time l Qt , and leisure x t equal total endowed time each period of T. With T normalized to 1, this implies
In nominal terms, at time t, with a price of goods denoted by P t , the consumer purchases goods P t c t , invests in holding money, M t+1 − M t , and invests in holding nominal bonds, denoted by B t . With R t denoting the nominal bond interest rate, this bond investment is +1 − (1 + ) . The consumer's income consists of nominal wages from working, (1 − − ), plus the nominal government transfer of revenue, H t . The consumer also receives each period a real goods endowment of z≥ 0, or P t z in nominal terms. The budget constraint is:
Let q t denote the real amount of goods that are bought with the credit service provided by the bank, with these credit purchases being a consumer financial liability due to be paid off by the end of the period from the consumers deposit account. The other financial liability can be considered to be the cash withdrawn from the bank deposit account during time t, as determined at the end of the last period. Each of these provide means of exchange that give rise to the exchange constraint whereby the sum of real money and credit purchases equal consumption good purchases, c t .
In particular, the exchange constraint is that real consumption can be bought with either real money m t ≡ M t /P t , or with real exchange credit q t :
Let the deposited funds in the bank account be denoted by d t , with these deposits being the consumer's asset of the net income deposited in the consumer's bank account by the goods producer and government transfers (H t ). The consumer's assets equal deposits, which in turn equal liabilities of cash withdrawals, m t , plus credit purchases q t . Given the exchange constraint in equation (5), by which consumption purchases equal the liabilities of real cash plus credit, this implies that d t = c t is a "balance sheet" constraint, with assets equal to liabilities. This incarnates the type of constraint recommended by Hicks (1935) . At the same time, the banking service is conducted by providing labor to the production of the credit service, within a representative agent framework in which the agent also acts in part as a bank. Or as Hicks (1935) puts it, with "every individual in the community as being, on a small scale, a bank. Monetary theory becomes a sort of generalisation of banking theory". 5 Following Clark (1984) , and the subsequent consistent literature known as the "production approach to banking" (Degryse, Kim, and Ongena 2009) , assume that the credit service production function is specified in Cobb-Douglas form as
The per unit of deposit amount of credit service produced is simply ( / ) = ( ) . Making the substitution of consumption goods for deposited funds, apply the balance constraint that d t = c t , since the bank problem is not decentralized here. Then as in Gillman and Nakov (2003 and , Gillman and Kejak (2004 , Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004) , Benk et al. (2005a Benk et al. ( , 2005b Benk et al. ( , 2008 Benk et al. ( , and 2010 , Gillman and Otto (2007) and Gillman and Yerokhin (2005) , the consumer acts also as banker and produces the credit service so that the normalized credit production function can be written as / = ( ) . Alternatively, the bank problem can be decentralized by which the consumer chooses d t , along with q t , with d t = c t as an added constraint of the consumer problem; for such a decentralization of the bank provision of exchange credit in a similar deterministic setting see Gillman and Kejak (2011). 6 Substituting the bank production function of equation (6), with d t substituted by c t , into the the exchange constraint gives the condition that
The government budget constraint in turn is that
with the provisions that there are zero net bond holdings in equilibrium and that the money supply for here grows at a constant rate σ such that
With a time discount factor of 1
1+
, the consumer problem in infinite horizon form adds one more variable l Qt to the standard Lucas (1980) cash-only cash-in-advance model, exchanges the shopping time s t of the McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) model with this "banking time" l Qt , and instead of a shopping time constraint includes a cash-in-advance exchange constraint extended to include an explicit money substitute used to avoid the inflation tax, this being exchange credit. With the budget constraint (4) written in real terms, with the time t + 1 inflation rate, π t+1 , defined by 1+ +1 ≡ +1 / , and with ≡ / , then given M 0 and B 0 ,the consumer problem is
The first-order equilibrium conditions (FOC) are as follows:
+1 ∶ − (
The equilibrium goods and exchange constraints are that = (1 − − ) + , and
The marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure, MRS c,x , primarily from equations (11) and (12), is the ratio of the shadow price of goods to the shadow price of leisure. The shadow price of leisure is the marginal product of labor w. The shadow price of goods consists of the goods cost of one, plus the exchange cost. The latter is a weighted average of the cost of using money, at an average cost per consumption unit of the nominal interest rate R, and the cost of using exchange credit, at an average cost per consumption unit of γR. Since γR < R, because γ ∈ [0, 1), then the average cost of exchange using credit per unit of consumption is less than that using money. The weights in this weighted average of exchange costs are the share of purchases using money, or the inverse consumption velocity, , and the share using credit. We can denote a t by ≡ , such that since c t = m t + q t , it results that 1 = + . This implies that q t /c t =1-a t . This makes MRS c,x equal to
Note that without leisure, with α = 0, then it results that the marginal benefit of consumption equals its shadow marginal cost, or 1 = [1 + + (1 − ) ], and the only way to avoid the inflation tax is with credit use; the leisure option is eliminated as an escape valve. Alternatively, with no credit available, as in the special case of a t = 1 (which occurs when A Q = 0), then equation (16) . This can be seen by substituting in the solution for normalized money demand, a t ∈ (0, 1], found in equation (22) below, and differentiating with respect to R t .
A lower exchange cost means the consumer effectively avoids some of the inflation tax, at the cost of the banking service, but with the advantage of less substitution towards leisure since the shadow cost of goods is not as high when credit is available. Choosing more leisure use avoids the inflation tax through less goods c t , which occurs when the shadow price of goods to leisure,
, rises as a result of an increased money supply growth rate, and a subsequently higher nominal interest rate R t (even as a t falls when R t rises).
That is,̃≥ 0. It results, as seen in Section 8 below, that the magnitude of the elasticity of money demand is increased much more by the ability to use credit than the ability to use leisure to avoid the inflation tax.
To see the result in full on equation (16) of raising the money supply growth rate, note that from the exchange constraint, +1 = +1 +1 . In the steady state +1 = , and so the money supply growth rate equals the inflation rate; 1 + σ = 1 + π. In addition, the Fisher equation holds from the bond FOC, in equation (14), such that 1 + = (1 + ) (1 + ), which in turn equals (1 + ) (1 + ) since = . This shows that an increase in the exogenous money supply growth rate σ causes R to rise proportionate with (1 + ); = 1 + , so R rises when σ rises, and̃also rises, but by less that R itself.
The FOC with respect to time in credit service production, l Qt , implies the Baumol condition of this model whereby the marginal cost of money equals the marginal cost of exchange credit. In particular, using that = t , from the equilibrium conditions for money M t+1 and bonds B t+1 , of equations (13) and (14), together with the l Qt FOC, of equation (15), implies that the marginal cost of exchange credit equals the marginal factor cost w divided by the marginal factor product of ( ) / ( ) = ( )
; or
The equalization of the price of exchange credit to its marginal factor cost divided by its marginal factor product, in equation (17), is a fundamental part of what is termed "price theory", or competitive microeconomic theory.
Substituting in for from the production function for exchange credit per unit of consumption, whereby = ( ) ( ) 1− , and so
implies that
Denoting the marginal cost of exchange credit per unit of consumption by MC q/c , and combining equations (17) and (19), allows the Baumol condition to be stated in terms of credit per unit of goods, q t /c t :
Let̂≡ / ( ( ) 1 ), so that the per unit marginal cost more simply is expressed as
Calibration
The calibration can be done for the US based on averages for the post-1959 period, viewed generally as a "moderately low inflation" historical period overall, in comparison to international historic experience including hyperinflation. Consider the standard M1 aggregate, and why it may not be the best basis for the post-1959 calibration. For the 58 years, from Jan. 1959 to Jan. 2018, the M1 velocity average is 6.8. However since the advent of money market fund popularity in the late 1970's and early 1980's, which initially avoided Regulation Q interest rate limits, deposits took off in (non-FDIC insured) money market deposit accounts (MMDA) and remained stagnant in (FDIC insured) deposit accounts. As a result, the income velocity of M1 does not track well the nominal interest rates such as the 1 year and 10 year US Treasury constant maturity rate, which rose steadily up until around 1980 and fell steadily thereafter. For this reason, Lucas and Nicolini (2015) construct a new monetary aggregate by adding the MMDA to M1. For this "M1MMDA" aggregate, they find a stable money demand function with cointegration evidence, in contrast of the no cointegration findings of Friedman and Kuttner (1992) using standard monetary aggregates. Now the Federal Reserve has constructed a new aggregate called MZM that adds the other checking accounts such as MMDA and other similar ones. This is a useful, innovative, aggregate with an income velocity that rises and falls historically with Treasury interest rates since 1959; this velocity can be found on the FRED database with the series name of MZMV. While this aggregate allows small amounts of interest to be paid on deposits such as MMDA, it offers an aggregate for which a stable money demand, such as that in the model, can be fitted. Therefore MZM offers one basis for the calibration.
The MZM velocity level averaged 2.2 from 1959 to 2018. Thus for the MZM aggregate, a 2.2 velocity level is the calibration target. In qualification, velocity in the model is the consumption velocity c/m, which is the same as the output velocity since y = c in the model without physical capital. With
An important parameter is the degree of leisure preference. One way to consider this is to look at the economy's solution for goods and leisure at the Friedman optimum of R = 0. Then the equilibrium solutions are = 1+ and = 1+ . With leisure preference of α = 0.5, then leisure equals 1/3 of free (non-maintenance) time and work is 2/3 of time by the allocation of time constraint. This is similar to saying that there are five days per week with eight hours of work per day, for a total of 40 hours a week, while having two weekend days with eight hours of leisure per day, plus one hour of leisure each of the other five days a week. This gives 21 hours of leisure and 40 h of work, for a division between work and leisure time as implied approximately in the model with α = 0.5 at the Friedman optimum.
An alternative calibration, which provides a more conservative basis for calculating the welfare cost of inflation, is to value leisure by twice as much, such that α = 1. This gives leisure time of = 1+ equal to 0.5. This one-half value for leisure is found within the typical range used in calibration (eg. Gomme and Rupert (2007) , with home production of goods, but not credit services). Even higher values of leisure make inflation even less costly. We will focus on α = 0.5 as the baseline calibration, with α = 1 as an alternative more conservative calibration.
Next, consider the Cobb-Douglas coefficient of labor time in banking, that is γ. In the decentralized bank sector optimization problem, as given in Gillman and Kejak (2011) , the parameter γ equals the value of the labor cost divided by the value of the credit output, as given by = . Following Benk, Gillman, and Kejak (2008) reasoning, consider the total cost of credit to be the cost of an American Express credit card (Amex) per year. As in the model, an Amex card typically must be paid off at the end of the period to avoid extra fees. But there is a cost to the card, even though interest is not charged for the credit. This cost is now $95 for an Amex "Blue Cash Everyday Card"; let the credit cost per person, wl Q , be approximated by this $95. Then the total cost needs to be divided by Rq to get the implied γ.
Picking which maturity for the Treasury interest rate corresponds to the nominal bond interest rate R in the model here is complex. Typically, one might consider one period in the model as being for example 1 year and so use the 1-year Treasury rate. And during the "normal" yet healthy growth periods of the 1960's, 1980's and 1990's a comparison of the 10 year and 1 year constant maturity US Treasury interest rates shows that the rates were mostly very close together. In that case, using either the 1-year or the 10 year rate would be of little consequence.
However, the short term and long term Treasury rates have diverged since 2001. Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, when the Fed first started driving the Federal Funds Rate below the CPI inflation rate for a sustained period, the 1 year rate has been below the 10 year rate almost all of the time. Further, the 1 year rate has also been below the inflation rate for most of the time since 2001, except for the 2 years starting late 2005. This has meant negative real interest rates as measured by the 1-year rate. In contrast the 10 year rate has had only brief periods of negative real interest rates, when inflation accelerated in the mid-1970's and in 1980, and for brief period during and since the Great Recession of 2008-2009. In the model here, a negative real interest rate can only occur with a negative rate of time preference, that is ρ < 0. But a negative ρ violates boundary conditions on utility, meaning that ρ is constrained to be positive. Therefore the view taken here is that the nominal interest rate chosen for the calibration should be consistent with data in which the corresponding real interest rate was mostly positive. Therefore, the 10 year Treasury rate is chosen as the nominal interest rate that corresponds best to the R of the model, for the full data period of 1959-2018; this is nearly equivalent to choosing the 1 year Treasury rate for the period ending in 2000. 8 The average 10-year Treasury bond rate, at an annual rate on a monthly basis, is 6.13 from 1959:1 to 2018:1. The 10 year Treasury rate has mostly positive real interest rates for the full period, so a 6.13 rate is chosen for the calibration for 1959-2018. It turns out that the calculated welfare cost is only slightly changed if 5.10, the 1959-2018 1-year Treasury bill rate, were used instead, while in contrast it is quite sensitive to the preference for leisure. Now consider an approach for calibrating the rate of time preference ρ by considering historical data on the real rate of interest for the Treasury interest rates relative to CPI inflation rates. Before the Vietnam War spending began ratcheting upwards, the annual inflation rate, taken by month, averaged 1.4% for the 7 years from Jan. 1959 to Jan. 1966. In the 1980's, the inflation rate fell to 3.8% in December 1982, and then averaged 4.5% for the 7 years from December 1982 to December 1989. For the 11 years from January 1990 to January 2000, the inflation rate averaged 4.3%. During these episodes of mostly healthy, above trend growth and stable relatively low inflation, the 1-year and 10-year real interest rates were of mostly similar magnitude and ranged from around 2 to 4%. Picking a midpoint, the calibration will assume that ρ = 0.03, giving a 3% real rate of interest.
Measure the credit q as = (1 − ), from the exchange constraint in equation (5) ](0.545) = 0.11, within the range of (0.11, 0.21) calibrated in Benk, Gillman, and Kejak (2005a , 2008 , and 2010 . 
Credit supply and money demand
It is useful to visualize the equilibria at the basis of the above calibrations. , or
Money demand falls with the interest rate R, rises with labor productivity w and falls with bank productivity . This means as the interest rate goes up, the interest elasticity becomes increasingly negative as in a Cagan money demand. In fact, the elasticity has a simple proportionality to q/m, the credit to cash ratio, that rises with the nominal interest rate R:
With the calibration, the elasticity is rather low at Lucas (2000) . Note however that this elasticity is not constant as in Baumol, but instead rises with the inflation rate in a way similar to Cagan (1956) . For Cagan, the interest elasticity is −, with̄the "semi-interest elasticity", so that the elasticity rises linearly in magnitude with R, as found for the US and UK by Benati et al. (2016) In the banking time money demand, this elasticity is
. Rewrite this using constantŝ1 and̂2, such that the elasticity is −̂1 Figure 3 graphs the elasticity magnitude. It shows how it rises from zero at the Friedman optimum of R = 0, at a varying rate, as R rises (solid curve). In comparison, a Cagan (1956) type elasticity magnitude that is linearly rising with R is graphed in the dashed line; here the slope is denoted by, which equals 2, less than for example the 7 value used in Cagan for certain hyperinflation examples. The elasticity using the alternative calibration with M1 is also graphed, in Blue; here the dashed line corresponding to a linearly rising Cagan elasticity has a slope of̄= 8. The interest elasticity of m/c is important to the welfare cost in that it determines the nature of the deadweight-loss "triangles" under the marginal cost curve in Figure 1 and under the money demand curve in Figure 2 . However the welfare cost can be derived in general equilibrium without integrating under the money demand curve. 
Welfare cost of inflation
The welfare cost of inflation is calculated by determining the compensating amount of goods z that is required to make the consumer equally well off when facing a positive inflation tax, of R>0, as when the consumer is instead at the optimum at which R =z= 0. Using the indirect utility function v as depending in general on R and z, with the optimum utility being that level of v at which z=R=0, the following equation allows for the determination of the cost z:
The indirect utility v denotes the agent's utility with the equilibrium goods and leisure substituted in. Given that there is no growth so that time subscripts can be dropped, use the marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure in equation (16) to solve for leisure and substitute this into the budget constraint of equation (4); also use the government budget constraint of equation (8) to eliminate the money and bond terms in equation (4). This yields the following expression for the equilibrium goods c along the stationary state:
The solution to l Q comes from the bank production function, given that the equilibrium q/c and m/c have been solved, with 1 = + . In particular, with / = ( ) 1− ( ) 1 1− , and from the production in equation (18) in which = ( ) , setting these equal provides the solution l Q /c:
With this solution and given the solution for a ≡ m/c in equation (22), write l Q as ( ) 1 1− and substitute this into equation (25) so that the closed-form solution for c can be derived in terms of various parameters including R (which equals (1 + ) (1 + ) − 1), with ρ and σ assumed parameters):
The solution for leisure follows directly from the intratemporal margin, whereby = [1+ +(1− ) ] . Using the solution for c from equation (27),
The welfare cost of inflation then follows from ( , ) = (0, 0) such that
The solution is that
For the baseline calibration, γ = 0.11, α = 0.5, w = 1, and A Q = 1.01. Putting in these values, then the cost for any R gives the function ( ). 10 Figure 4 graphs the welfare cost function showing for example how R = 0.133 (when π = 0.10) gives a cost of 1.48% of full income. Normalizing the welfare cost by consumption basically factors the cost by 1.5 since at R = 0, = / (1 + ) = 0.67, and it falls some as R rises; so with this normalization the cost would be about (1.48) 1.5 = 2.2, or about 2.2% of output for R = 0.133. To compute the cost of a 10% inflation rate versus a zero inflation rate, similar to the most common calculation of welfare cost found in the literature (eg. Bailey 1956; Silva 2012) consider that 1 + = (1 + ) (1 + ). With ρ = 0.03 and π = 0.10, then R = 0.133 gives a cost of 1.5% as a share of full income. But at π = 0, R = ρ, and so the welfare cost of ( ) = (0.03) must be subtracted from the cost (0.133) to compute the cost of 10% inflation instead of zero. Therefore the cost of a 10% inflation rate instead of a zero rate is (0.133) − (0.03) = 0.0148 − 0.0036 = 0.011, or 1.1% of full income. Again, put in terms of the cost as a share of output, instead of as a share of full income (w), this rises to about (1.1) 1.5 = 1.65, or about 1.65%. These cost estimates are well within the range of the literature; see Adao and Silva (2018) and Silva (2012) . Now consider the alternative calibration with leisure preference doubled from α = 0.5 to α = 1. Then the cost estimate for R = 0.133 is 0.47 of full income, about half the level when α = 0.5. This is shown in Figure 4 by the dashed line.
11 For the cost of a 10% inflation rate instead of a zero rate, the cost is noŵ(0.133) −̂(0.03) = 0.0047 − 0.0009 = 0.0038, or 0.38% of full income. With c ≃ 0.5 in this case, the cost z/c is about (2) 0.38 = 0.76, or 0.76% as a share of output. With a higher preference for leisure, the cost of avoiding inflation is lower. This results since leisure use gives greater utility and is a way to avoid the inflation tax, along with credit use. Credit use itself, per unit of consumption, does not change, and the money demand function as drawn for m/c in = 0.65 at R = 0. The welfare cost of R = 0.133 is 0.70% of full income, in this third case. As a fraction of output, the 0.70 rises to 0.7 (1.5) = 1.05, or about 1.05% since c ≃ 0.67. To find the cost of a 10% inflation rate instead of a zero inflation rate,̃(0.133) −̃(0.03) = 0.0070 − 0.0019 = 0.0051, or 0.51% of full income, and about 0.76% as a fraction of output. This 0.76% is the same magnitude as with the alternative MZM calibration with α = 1.
Low inflation regime welfare cost
While low inflation rates can be negative, a positive 2% inflation rate is both a low inflation rate and a level that is ubiquitous in the lexicon of inflation rate targeting policies both in the US and around the world. At the same time, ever since Friedman's (1969) optimum of a negative rate of inflation as the optimum, there has been a conflict between the theoretical optimum rate of inflation and the policy practice, in that policy seems to avert systemically a negative rate of inflation. A zero rate of inflation however is often mentioned as a feasible inflation rate target, such as in US law, while the 2% target has morphed into the accepted rate of inflation to target by central banks.
There are many theoretical reasons given for targeting a rate of inflation above the Friedman (1969) optimum, for example with foci on the nature of Laspeyres (CPI) and Paache (GDP deflator) indices and the so-called substitution bias. This latter distinction on how the indices are calculated has been made innocuous by the development of chained indices that mostly eliminate the Laspeyres tendency to overstate the inflation rate. The quality measurement problem is a long standing one also used to suggest that a higher inflation rate target than otherwise is warranted because the goods being indexed are of a higher quality and naturally worth more. There are also monopoly power justifications given for aiming for a positive inflation rate target.
Putting aside the various justifications for above-zero inflation rate targets, let's simply consider the cost of following a central bank target of 2% versus US law's statement of a zero inflation rate, as calculated within this economy with banking time. To apply the model here, a 2% inflation rate corresponds to an R of = (1 + 0.02) (1 + 0.03) − 1 = 0.051. With the baseline calibration, from equation (30) Using the more conservative alternative calibration with α = 1, this becomeŝ(0.051) −̂(0.03) = 0.0011 − 0.0009 = 0.0002, or 0.02% of full income. As a percent of output, c = 0.5 at R = 0 in this case, so the cost is about 0.04% of output.
Lastly, using the calibration with α = 0.5 but using the aggregate M1, the welfare cost is̃(0.051)−̃(0.03) = 0.003 − 0.0019 = 0.0011, or 0.11 of one percent of full income. As a percent of output, this is approximately (0.11) 1.5 = 0.165, or 0.165% of output.
To summarize, in the baseline, for a two percent inflation rate instead of a zero inflation rate, the welfare cost of this inflation is 0.36% of output. This gives a range of estimates from in billions of dollars from 8 to 33 to 72 per year due to hitting a target inflation rate of 2% instead of one of zero as specified in the 1978 Act. As of October 2018, CPI inflation is 2.5% at an annual rate, so the welfare cost currently is actually even higher as compared to a zero inflation rate.
Comparison to models without credit and/or leisure
Compare the welfare cost of inflation in the baseline model with credit and leisure to models in which there is either no credit, no leisure, or neither credit or leisure. First consider a cash-only economy, with leisure, but without credit available. In this case m/c = 1, q/c = 0, l Q = 0, and from equation (30) For R = 0.133, this 0.18% is eight-fold smaller than the higher welfare cost of 1.48% when credit is available through banking, in the baseline economy above. This lower welfare cost without credit available is due to there being only goods to leisure substitution available to avoid the inflation tax in the cash only case. With cash only, the interest elasticity of m/c in equation (23) is zero, making money always inelastically demanded, and causing a relatively low welfare cost of inflation. The higher interest elasticity and welfare cost with credit stems from the ability to substitute from cash to credit, while also using the goods to leisure substitution margin. Now consider the case with no leisure. To do this, simply assume leisure is not valued, as in Lucas's (2000) shopping time model. What would be the welfare cost of inflation in this case, with banking time use instead of shopping time? Setting α = 0 in the welfare cost function of equation (30) above results in
which by equation (26) or 0.88% of full income. As a share of output, since consumption is nearly 1 in this case, it is the same 0.88% as a share of output. In terms of a 10% inflation rate instead of 0, the cost in this case is 0.87767 − 1 ( (0.03)(0.11)(1.01) 1 ) 1 1−(0.11) = 0.87602, which is the same 0.88% when rounded off. This welfare cost estimate is higher than when there is no credit, but leisure is valued at α = 0.5 as above; in the latter case the cost is 0.18% of full income. With R = 0.133, the cost from only banking time to avoid inflation of 0.88 compares to 1.48% when there is also leisure preference, and to 0.18 when there is leisure but not banking. This means that with only leisure to avoid inflation, the welfare cost is the lowest, since leisure is not a great substitute for goods, and this makes money demand relatively interest inelastic. When in contrast only credit is available but not leisure, the welfare cost is higher since credit use alone to avoid inflation is a better substitute than leisure use alone. The interest elasticity of money demand is higher in magnitude with credit use alone than with leisure use alone. With both credit and leisure use to avoid inflation the interest elasticity is higher in magnitude and so is the welfare cost.
To see this in terms of elasticities, the magnitude of the interest elasticity of m/c is
, which equals 0.185 for the baseline calibration with R = 0.133; this can be seen in Figure   3 .. When credit q equals zero, this interest elasticity of m/c equals zero. Then the only elasticity of money with respect to the interest rate, denoted by , when m = c always, is the same as the interest elasticity of c; = . By equation (27), with q = 0, then = 1+ (1+ ) and the elasticity with respect to R is = 1+ (1+ ) = . In the case of no credit, and with R = 0.133 and α = 0.5, then = 1+ (1+ ) = (0.5)0.133 1+(0.5)(1+0.133) = 0.042. This is a low elasticity, being almost zero.
The interest elasticity magnitudes, given the baseline calibration, triples with credit only as a substitute to money use, but no leisure, as compared to the case of leisure only and no credit. With credit only, the elasticity of m with respect to R is the elasticity of with respect to R plus the elasticity of c with respect to R; = + . With no leisure, c is now given from equation (27) . The interest elasticity of this c is
This makes the interest elasticity of money m with respect to R equal to
With the baseline calibration, at R = 0.133, this elasticity magnitude is 0.195. 12 The higher interest elasticity with only credit, but no leisure, corresponds to the higher welfare cost of inflation for this case, as compared to when there is positive leisure, but no credit use; these are 0.88% versus 0.18%, respectively for R = 0.133. The interest elasticity for the full model with both credit and leisure can be calculated from equation (27) as
With the baseline calibration, and R = 0.133, this elasticity magnitude is equal to 0.212, and it corresponds to the higher welfare cost of 1.48%. 13 Note that a banking time cost, or a related shopping time cost as in Lucas (2000), without leisure value but with time, can be viewed an underestimate of welfare cost relative to when leisure is valued. Without leisure value, the welfare cost z/w in equation (31) is analytically equal to , by equation (26). Calculating this directly, = (0.0088), as found above, while = (0.0088) = 0.646 (0.0088) = 0.0057. In the related Lucas example, the welfare cost is exactly the shopping time, which Lucas denotes by s(r). In his equation 5.7, he defines this welfare cost and comments that "In this model, the time spent economizing on cash use, s(r), has the dimensions of a percentage reduction in production and consumption, and hence is itself a direct measure of the welfare cost of inflation, interpreted as wasted time."
The welfare cost comparison between the banking time and shopping time models is a valid one in that the banking time model can be restated exactly as a shopping time function in formal terms. To see this, recall that banking time is l Q , with = ( ) 
Discussion
On the magnitude of the welfare cost of inflation, when banking is allowed or not allowed, a closely related work is Silva (2012) . As in this paper and Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998), Silva also finds that banking expands with the rate of inflation. Silva uses a Jovanovic (1982) type Baumol (1952 ) -Tobin (1956 approach whereby the timing of the withdrawals of money from the bank is modeled so as to create an endogenous velocity. This allows for a cost of banking to enter the money demand and the welfare cost calculation. Silva's approach is related to the use of the bank production function here as in the so-called "financial intermediation approach to banking" (Degryse, Kim, and Ongena 2009 ). Silva finds a robust estimate for a 10% inflation instead of zero of about 0.95% (no leisure in utility) to 1.33% (with leisure in utility) as a share of output, with the banking and endogenous velocity. This compares fairly closely to this paper's baseline estimate of 1.65% for a like amount of inflation with banking and leisure.
Alternatively, without banking, but with leisure, this paper finds a 0.12 estimate for a 10% inflation instead of zero. This compares for example to Silva's (2012) 0.36% estimate where banking is not endogenous, but there is leisure in utility; Silva also uses log utility as in this paper and has a calibration for leisure preference which is higher than in this paper. See Silva and Adao and Silva (2018) for a review of other estimates in the literature; for example Cooley and Hansen (1989) also have a comparatively low welfare cost estimate with a cash-only economy, as in this paper. For another use of banking intermediation costs to estimate welfare measures, in this case a Leontieff banking production function for intertemporal loans, see Antunes, Cavalcanti, and Villamil (2013) .
Lucas (2000) and Silva (2012) define the welfare cost as the compensation to equilibrium consumption necessary to keep the consumer utility the same when facing a certain high inflation relative to facing either the optimum (of R = 0 in Lucas) or a lower inflation rate such as zero (in Silva), but without any leisure adjustment. This paper differs slightly by defining the welfare cost by the amount of goods that need to be transferred to the consumer to make the consumer indifferent between some high inflation rate versus having no such transfer and facing the Friedman optimum of R = 0. This compensating income transfer is not to the optimum consumption bundle, but rather to the budget of the consumer, through equation (24), as in Gillman (1993; equation 16) . This means that here leisure and consumption adjust optimally given the transfer z.
The welfare cost of inflation in this paper is the deadweight loss from raising money through the inflation tax for government expenditure, with the inflation tax proceeds returned as lump sum income. Therefore the welfare loss is only from the distortions of induced substitution from goods towards leisure, plus the cost of banking under the marginal cost curve in Figure 1 , up to the equilibrium q/c. This cost of banking is also measured by the area under the money demand m/c in Figure 2 up to the equilibrium quantity of money per unit of consumption, m/c. Others such as Adao and Silva (2018) and Cooley and Hansen (1991) consider broader financing possibilities including both the inflation tax and other forms of direct taxation such as on labor.
The equalization of the marginal cost of money to its marginal benefit, as in equation (20), is the equilibrium condition found in monetary economies that leads directly to the model's underlying demand for money function. Lucas (2000) carefully qualifies this equilibrium condition as what we can call a money demand function, within a representative consumer framework with competitive price-taking consumers and firms. This equilibrium condition can be found since Samuelson's (1947) static money-in-the-utility function (MIUF) economy, for example with utility being specified as ( , ), and carried on in current dynamic MIUF economies. The MIUF equilibrium condition is that the marginal rate of substitution between money and goods equals the nominal interest rate: ( / ) = . Given the utility function, the money demand results.
Exchange economies such as Lucas (1980) bring the margin into play through the ratio of the shadow value of the exchange constraint to the shadow value of the budget constraint, whereby again it results albeit implicitly using envelop conditions that the ratio of the marginal utility of money to that of goods equals the nominal interest rate. However such cash-in-advance exchange economies without credit typically have a velocity set at one, making them not well-poised to estimate the welfare cost of inflation. In shopping time models, velocity is made endogenous, through the equilibrium condition given by = − , using the ( , ) for the shopping time function as above. The marginal cost of money equals the marginal benefit of reducing the value of time needed for shopping by using one more unit of money; the money demand then results once g is specified in terms of c and m. King and Plosser (1984) instead posed the question of how to include exchange credit through banking production in a general equilibrium representative agent model of the real business cycle variant that also includes money. They conclude that using labor and capital in the production function of banking gives a constant marginal cost of credit. In turn this constant marginal credit cost could have no unique equilibrium with a constant marginal cost of money, this being the nominal interest rate. 15 At the same time, in the banking microeconomic literature, Clark (1984) argues that the bank production function needs to include not just labor and capital but also deposited funds, all in a Cobb-Douglas form. Hancock (1985) successfully validates this form through estimation of the bank production function. This production form with deposits included has been used since empirically since in the banking literature, such as in Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Wheelock and Wilson (2012) , and as reviewed in Degryse, Kim, and Ongena (2009) .
The advantage of using the Clark (1984) form in general equilibrium, as in Gillman and Kejak (2011) , is that the units get corrected in this way so as to allow a unique equilibrium of credit and money. In particular, the marginal cost of credit, per unit of deposits, equals the marginal cost of money, per unit of goods. With deposits equal to goods in equilibrium in these models, the unit is a good for the marginal cost of both credit and money. On a per unit of goods basis, the marginal cost of credit endogenously is upwards sloping and so provides a unique equilibrium for a given interest rate. This in turn gives the money demand as a residual of the credit demand, with the sum of money and credit purchases equaling total goods consumed and produced per period (in a model without capital).
In contrast, to get around the necessity of having an upward sloping marginal cost of banking, for example, Berk and Green (2004) study mutual funds with the assumption of a convex cost function such that there is an upward sloping marginal cost of the mutual funds. This enables a unique equilibrium of how much mutual funds to produce with the given interest rate. Others take a similar approach of assuming a convex cost of credit function. Stokey (1983, 1987) ) model money and exchange credit in their cash-good, credit-good extension of the Lucas (1980) cash-in-advance economy. This includes no real resource of credit use, in the sense that King and Plosser (1984) discuss, and as is used in this paper, as well as in Silva (2012), Adao and Silva (2018) , and Antunes, Cavalcanti, and Villamil (2013) . The credit good in the Lucas-Stokey model has a shadow price of one, while the cash good has a shadow price of 1 + R, as in the original Lucas (1980) CIA model. Each the cash and credit goods separately enter the utility function, so some of the cash good is bought according to preferences. There is no real resource use of credit and Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas (1991) find this model inconsistent with certain velocity evidence; see Silva (2012) for a related discussion on endogenous velocity approaches in the literature. Lucas (2000) instead turns to each a Sidrauski (1967a and 1967b) money in the utility function model (MIUF) and a McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) shopping time model to estimate welfare cost, with the latter explicitly involving real resource cost in evading the inflation tax. There Lucas also shows elegantly how to backwards engineer the money demand function using a general specification of MIUF model, while allowing either the Cagan or Baumol-Tobin form in his shopping time model.
The banking time approach here produces an endogenous money demand from the other end without predetermination of money demand. Rather than assuming a utility function or transaction cost function specifically designed to yield the desired money demand, the bank approach lets the form of the bank production function determine the form of the money demand. This is advantageous in giving estimates of welfare cost because the degree of free parameters gets restricted by the bank production function and information on the parameters of that function. While the calibration of the cost of banking in this paper is rudimentary, other innovative approaches are possible that estimate banking costs in different ways, such as using national income accounts and detailed bank industry data.
Policy implications
Policy implications are tangible in the following sense, related to Adao and Silva (2018) . With a 2% inflation rate instead of 0, the amount of money being generated through money printing to pay for US federal expenditure can be calculated. The real value of the inflation tax at each year t equals . With a 2% inflation rate, and say a 2% growth rate in output, then the money supply growth rate would be (1.02) (0.02) + 0.02 = 0.0404, about 4%. This is similar to Friedman's (1960) money supply rule.
The amount of government spending as a share of output, ϕ, financed with this 4% money supply growth is σ/V. Consider the velocity of the monetary aggregate that may best correspond to the inflation tax. As of May 2018, the US monetary base and M1 were both the same at $3.7 trillion, which is (3.7) /20 = 0.185, or 18.5% of the $20 trillion US output. In current velocity terms, this is a 20/3.7 = 5. 41 velocity. Letting V = 5.41, then the share of output financed, ϕ, by the 2 inflation is 0.04/5.41 = 0.0074, or 0.74%. This is equal to $20(0.0074) = $0.148 trillion, or $148 billion a year. Total US Federal government expenditure is $4.5 trillion for 2018:Q1. So under the assumptions made, the 2% inflation rate instead of zero currently yields 148 4479 = 0.033, or 3.3% of federal government expenditure. Were velocity higher, then the percent of revenue from inflation finance would be less, a point emphasized in Adao and Silva (2018) .
The middle range welfare cost calculation found above implies, using the M1 aggregate, that some $33 billion is a deadweight loss on route to raising $148 billion in additional spending for the government, or about a 20% economic loss rate. Consider also how the Fed has used the inflation tax revenue which it is supposed to return to the US Treasury (as the Fed's "profit"). From September 2009 to May 2018, excess reserves held at the Fed have averaged on a monthly basis $1.763 trillion. Over the same period the monthly average Interest On Excess Reserves (IOER) rate was 0.45%. Using these averages, a simple estimate is that the Fed directly paid banks $(1.763)0.45=$0.793 trillion, or $793 billion since 2009. This means that rather than returning all of the inflation tax revenue to the Treasury, an amount equal to some 5 years of the inflation tax revenue from a 2% inflation rate as calculated above, at $148 billion a year, was instead used to subsidize the bank sector, in violation of previous Fed policy (before 2008) not to influence unduly any one sector of the economy. Or put differently, the somewhat less than $33 billion welfare cost per year, for the period from November 2009 to May 2018 when the CPI inflation rate averaged 1.7% on a monthly basis, implies a cumulative loss nearing some $330 billion, close to half of the amount that the Fed paid directly to banks.
The 2018 Fed operating budget is reported by the Fed to be $4.45 billion. If the Fed 2% inflation target instead of zero is causing a welfare loss of some $33 billion, then the total economic cost of the current Fed policy including all of their operating cost is about $37 billion. With a zero inflation target, the $33 billion would be saved. A simple way to successfully keep the inflation rate around zero, is to set the quarterly money supply growth rate σ, for the current quarter, equal to the output growth rate, g y , reported for the previous quarter. Then money supply and demand would be about equal over time. As a simple rule that would enforce the 1978 Act inflation target, this would also presumably eliminate the welfare loss associated with a 2% instead of zero inflation rate.
The inflation tax revenue with a zero inflation rate would then be only the "natural seigniorage" from keeping a stable value of the government's currency. With a 2% growth rate of output, this money supply increase, of the monetary base or M1 both at $3.7 trillion in 2018, still yields a significant revenue of $(0.02)3.7 = 0.074 trillion, or $74 billion, in current dollars. This would be how much inflation tax the Fed would raise each year. This would in turn allow, after budget expense, some $70 billion to be returned to Treasury, or 1.6% ( 0.70 4.5 = 0.16) of government expenditures, by following the 1978 Act that governs current Fed policy, while saving the welfare cost of some $7 to $72 billion a year.
Conclusion
The model provides a microeconomic founded way to provide an estimate of the welfare cost of inflation for any inflation rate. Estimates are provided under a baseline and two alternative calibrations. The estimates are also compared with different model cases such as with no banking and with no leisure. With banking time, the cost estimate is precisely consistent with a shopping time approach in its use of real resources, but formulated using a bank production function of the Clark (1984) variety. This replaces an arbitrary transaction cost function designed to give a certain money demand function with a marginal cost of banking consistent with the banking literature such that the money demand is implied as a result.
Cost estimates are made for a 10% inflation rate instead of zero inflation, and for a 2% inflation rate instead of zero. A zero inflation rate is put forth as the target in the 1978 Amendments to the 1946 Act governing Fed policy. For a 2% inflation rate instead of zero, using the paper's M1 calibration, the cost estimate is $33 billion a year. This magnitude suggests it is worth considering why the Fed targets 2% inflation rather than following the 1978 US Act prescribing zero inflation. This is especially true now that the unemployment rate has fallen below the 4% target also found in the 1978 US Act, leaving the Fed without an escape hatch from the 1978 Act. a private individual's income and expenditure account; we ask which of the items in that account are under the individual's own control, and then how he will adjust these items in order to reach a most preferred position. On the production side, we make a similar analysis of the profit and loss account of the firm. My suggestion is that monetary theory needs to be based again upon a similar analysis, but this time, not of an income account, but of a capital account, a balance sheet. We have to concentrate on the forces which make assets and liabilities what they are. So as far as banking theory is concerned, this is really the method which is currently adopted; though the essence of the problem is there somewhat obscured by the fact that banks, in their efforts to reach their " most preferred position " are hampered or assisted by the existence of conventionial or legally obligatory reserve ratios. For theoretical purposes, this fact ought only to be introduced at a rather late stage; if that is done, then my suggestion can be expressed by saying that we ought to regard every individual in the community as being, on a small scale, a bank. Monetary theory becomes a sort of generalisation of banking theory" (bold added, p. 12, Hicks 1935) . 6 Using the centralized banking approach in this paper, consumption goods equal deposits and so enter the bank production function instead of deposits, while Gillman and Kejak (2011) decentralize the bank sector and so the consumer chooses deposits subject to the constraint that deposits equal consumption; this yields that the return on deposits R d equals the shadow value of the deposit constraint (d = c). The bank optimization with respect to deposits d in turn yields the profit per unit of deposits given back to the consumer, who owns the bank, whereby = (1 − ) = (1 − ) .
7 In a shopping time economy, with leisure, this marginal rate is = as in this paper's model. 8 Explaining how short term interest rates could fall below the inflation rate for the extended period since the Great Recession is the subject matter of Csabafi et al. (2018) , using a related model with shocks to both goods and banking sectors. 9 Note that this graph, which is normalized by c, is the same for any value of leisure preference . . 15 See Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) and Li (2000) where this issue is resolved by either assuming a money demand or assuming dropping the Cobb-Douglas form by assuming diminishing returns in labor, with no capital.
